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By analysing 121 opinion polls, Harold D. Clarke, Matthew Goodwin, and Paul
Whiteley outline what happened with the EU referendum survey results. They explain why
internet surveys performed substantially better than telephone ones – contrary to the post-
2015 General Election ‘wisdom’ that telephone surveys should be preferred. Underlying trends
showed that once methodological artefacts are controlled, Leave was almost certainly ahead of
Remain over the entire last month of the campaign – and possibly throughout 2016.
After the 2015 general election, pollsters were roundly criticised for their failure to predict the
Conservative victory. Did they fail again in the EU referendum? If so, just how badly did they do?
Did they all get it very wrong, or did some do much better than others? And, taking artefacts
introduced by polling methodology into account, what did underlying trends in Remain and Leave
support look like in the run-up to voting day? Going forward, what lessons can we learn?
We address these questions by using a technique called ‘dynamic factor analyses’ on 121 internet
and telephone surveys conducted between January 11 and June 22, 2016.[i] We use a
statistical model originally developed in research on the performance of polls conducted in an
Australian national election campaign.[ii] A large majority of the survey data employed here
was gathered by nine survey organisations (‘houses’) and we also include several additional
surveys in a residual ‘miscellaneous’ category for other organisations reporting one to three
polls.
Modes
We begin by investigating what survey researchers call ‘mode’ eﬀects. These eﬀects concern the impact of
diﬀerences in the way surveys are conducted on the results they produce. In the case of the 121 EU referendum
surveys of interest here, all were administered either by internet (N = 81) or telephone (N = 40). Analysing the
results (percentages of Remain and Leave supporters in various surveys) using our model reveals that both
types of polls signiﬁcantly overestimated the Remain vote share and underestimated the Leave share (see
Figure 1). However, there were sizable diﬀerences between the two types of polls, with the mode eﬀect for
equaling 5.1 per cent for internet polls as compared to fully 9.2 per cent for telephone polls.[iii] Taken as a group,
internet polls tended to perform considerably better than their telephone-based rivals.
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Houses
What about the performance of individual survey companies? Our analysis of house eﬀects indicates that survey
ﬁrms varied markedly in their ability to gauge EU vote intentions. Figure 2 documents that, for the 9 survey
organisations considered, TNS-BMRB, ICM and YouGov performed best — their overestimates of the Remain
vote share were +2.24 per cent, +2.71 per cent and +3.24 per cent, respectively. Similarly, these three houses
did best on estimating Leave support. TNS-BMRB underestimated the Leave share by -2.35 per cent, with ICM
missing by -2.81 per cent and YouGov, by -3.34 per cent. All of the surveys conducted by TNS-BMRB (5
surveys) and YouGov (28 surveys) were done by internet, as were 23 of 26 ICM surveys.
Note: solid colored bars are for survey houses doing all or most of their polling by
internet; striped bars are for survey houses doing all or most of their polling by
telephone.  Populus has 3 internet polls and 2 telephone polls.
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The three ﬁrms performing worst were Populus, IPSOS and ComRes, with Remain house eﬀects equaling
+6.02, +.6.34 and +6.72 per cent, respectively. Populus missed the Leave percentage by -6.10 points, whereas
IPSOS missed by -6.45 per cent and ComRes by -6.85 per cent. All 7 of IPSOS polls were done by telephone,
as were 9 of the 11 ComRes polls, and 2 of the 5 Populus polls. Survation was another house that performed
poorly (a +5.54 per cent overestimate for Remain and -5.67 per cent underestimate for Leave).  All but one of
Survation’s 8 polls were conducted by telephone. ORB, with a Remain house eﬀect of +4.76 per cent and a
Leave house eﬀect of -4.87 per cent, did 9 of its 13 polls by telephone.
Underlying Trends
By controlling for mode and house eﬀects, our analyses enable us to estimate underlying trends in the dynamics
of support in EU referendum vote intentions. The results (Figure 3) indicate that Leave led Remain over the
entire period from 11 January 2016 onward. The size of the Leave lead varies widely—from a low of .39 per cent
(4 February) to a high of 13.2 per cent (12 June)—but Leave is always ahead.
The analysis also provides insight regarding the eﬀects of various events that occurred during the campaign. For
example, contrary to his intentions, US President Barack Obama’s widely publicized ‘UK to the back of the
queue’ intervention may have boosted, rather than diminished, Leave support. In contrast, as numerous
observers have speculated, the murder of Labour MP Jo Cox on 16 June may have precipitated an ongoing
erosion in Leave support over the ﬁnal week before the vote. That downturn in Leave’s vote intention share
notwithstanding, the analysis documents that over the last month of the campaign the lower bound of the 95 per
cent credible (conﬁdence) interval for the Leave vote always exceeds the 50 per cent mark. This means that
Leave was very likely ahead throughout this entire period.
What lessons can we learn?
Overall, the analyses suggest two general lessons for consumers of political polls. First, house eﬀects
associated with selected internet survey ﬁrms were quite modest, whereas ﬁrms relying heavily or exclusively on
telephone surveys found themselves considerably further oﬀ the mark. After the 2015 general election, internet
surveys were widely criticized and some commentators claimed that telephone surveys were a preferred
alternative. At the time this assertion seemed dubious given that telephone surveys’ typically dismal response
rates clearly gainsays any claim to be true ‘probability’ surveys. As documented above, the relatively poor
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performance of telephone surveys in the EU referendum reinforces doubts about their superiority.
A second lesson is that the ‘topline’ results from surveys are not enough. If observers had used the polling data
as inputs to statistical models of the underlying dynamics of EU referendum vote intentions rather than risking
being misled by the vagaries introduced by mode and house eﬀects in successive individual polls, they might not
have been surprised by the Brexit result. High quality polls by reputable survey houses should be viewed as a
key resource—not a substitute—for informed political analysis.
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[i] The polling data for the UK EU referendum are available here. “Undecideds” are allocated
proportionately to the Remain and Leave categories
[ii] See Simon Jackman, ‘Pooling the Polls Over an Election Campaign‘. Australian Journal of Political Science
40: 499-517. The analysis employs Bayesian MCMC methods.  Posterior distributions for model parameters are
generated using Winbugs 14 in conjunction with the R2Winbugs R package.
The pooling the polls model has two equations—a measurement equation and a state equation for the latent
level of Remain/Leave support.  The measurement equation is:
yit = δi + αt + εit
where: yit = is a poll by survey house i at time t; δ i = house or mode eﬀect parameter;  αt = latent vote intention
(Remain or Leave) at time t and εit is a stochastic error ~N(0,σ12).
The state (latent transition) equation is a random walk: αt  = 1.0* αt-1 + ζt  where
ζt ~ N(0, σ22).  εit and ζt are assumed to be independent.
[iii] Statistics reported in Figures 1, 2 and 3 are means of posterior distributions of parameters of interest.
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